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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REPORT 
OF THE GRAND JURY; PETI-
TIONERS H. C. SHOEMAKER, 
WILLIAM A. DAWSON, PHILO 
T. FARNS\XrORTH, D. H. WHIT-
TENBURG, HARLEY J. CORLEIS-
SEN. and LAYTON MAXFIELD; 
t1nd PROVO CITY, a Municipal 
Corporation of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, in the interest 
of the GRAND JURY PRESENT-
MENT, otherwise referred to as the 
UTAH COUNTY GRAND JURY 
REPORT, Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 7856 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal arises from a memorandum decision (Rec. 
81-89) by F. W. Keller, District Judge of the Seventh Judicial 
District, filed with the county clerk of Utah County on April 
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17, 1952, which expunged from the records of the District 
Court of Utah County certain portions of a report of a Utah 
County Grand Jury presented in open court on the first day 
of December, 1951. 
On August 8, 1951, a Grand Jury was duly drawn and 
impaneled for Utah County (Rec. 5). This body of seven 
citizens was duly charged by the court (Rec. 6-17) as to the 
duties and responsibilities under the statutes of the state of 
Utah. We quote this charge in part (Rec. 7): 
Where, in the discharge of your statutory duties 
as set forth in this charge, you find conditions worthy 
of special comment by you, even though no indictment 
may be found, it is your duty to report such conditions 
to the Court so that proper public officers may have 
an opportunity to correct undesirable or questionable · 
conditions, and so that the public of this County may 
be informed as to the condition of health of their 
government and administration. 
After three and a half months of deliberation, the Grand 
Jury in response to the charge of the Court presented a report 
entitled, "Grand Jury Presentment," (Rec. 21) which was 
signed individually by each of the grand jurors. This report 
is made up of seven divisions. Division 1 deals with findings and 
recommendations concerning Utah State Training School (Rec. 
22) ; division 2 is composed of findings and recommendations 
concerning the Utah State Hospital (Rec. 30); division 3 is com-
posed of findings and recommendations concerning the op-
erations of the State Road Commission in Utah County (Rec. 
39) ; division 4 deals with the affairs of Utah County (Rec. 
45); division 5 concerns the Alpine School District (Rec. 47); 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
division 6, the findings and recommendations concerning law 
enforcement in Provo City (Rec. 48); and division 7 con-
cludes with general recommendations of the Grand Jury 
(Rec. 51). 
After the presentment had been preferred to the court 
and made public, H. C. Shoemaker, William A. Dawson, 
Philo T. Farnsworth, D. H. Whittenburg, Harley J. Cor-
leissen and Layton Maxfield filed a petition to expunge the 
grand jury report. In addition, a Motion to Expunge was 
filed on behalf of Provo City. In each case, the motions were 
supported by affidavits by those seeking expunction (Rec. 54-
73). In response to the aforementioned motions, a motion to 
strike paragraphs, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the petition of 
H. C. Shoemaker, et al., and the affidavits in support thereof, 
and part of paragraph 2 of the Provo City motion and the 
affidavits of W. J. Farley and Clair M. Aldrich in support 
thereof, was filed on behalf of the people of the state of Utah. 
The matter was subsequently submitted to the Honorable F. 
W. Keller, District Judge siting specially for the Fourth Judi-
cial District. On April 15, 1952, the Honorable Judge Keller 
rendered a memorandum decision, the effect of which was to 
grant the Motion to Strike filed on behalf of the people of 
the state of Utah and to expunge a part of the grand Jury 
pr~sentment, as follows (Rec. 89) : 
1. That portion thereof dealing with the American 
Fork Training School and its administration under the 
title, "Findings and Recommendations Concerning the 
Utah State Training School. 
2. That portion thereof dealing with the activities 
of the State Road Commission in Utah County under 
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the title, "Findings and Recommendations Concerning 
the Operations of the State Road Commission in Utah 
County. 
Except as indicated in the two paragraphs next 
above, the motion of the Commissioners to expunge 
the entire report of the grand jury is denied. 
I order expunged from the grand jury report all of 
that portion thereof under the title, "Findings and 
Recommendations With Respect to Law Enforcement 
in Provo City," except paragraph three and the last 
paragraph under that title. 
From this decision this appeal is made. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I 
A GRAND JURY IS EMPOWERED TO MAKE A RE-
PORT OF ITS INVESTIGATIONS EVEN THOUGH IT 
DOES NOT RETURN AN INDICTMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A GRAND JURY IS EMPOWERED TO MAKE A RE-
PORT OF ITS INVESTIGATIONS EVEN THOUGH IT 
DOES NOT RETURN AN INDICTMENT. 
· It is the view of appellant that this appeal raises one 
question, viz., the power of a grand jury to make a report in 
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the nature of a presentment without returning an indictment. 
In other words, the power of a grand jury to make report of 
conditions existing ·within public institutions and offices in-
vestigated by the grand jury and concerning which the grand 
jury has received evidence, even though, in the opinion of 
the grand jury, the evidence received does not warrant the 
return of an indictment. 
Appellant contends for the affirmative of this proposition 
and respectfully submits that the common law and the law of 
jurisdictions which proceed under statutes, which for all prac-
tical purposes are identical to those of the State of Utah, gov-
erning the deliberations and procedures of grand juries, support 
appellant's position. 
Appellant will discuss the law as it relates to this problem 
under two principal heads, viz., the power of the grand jury 
at common law, and the power of the grand jury under the 
modern codes. 
(A) At Common Law 
It can be safely asserted that at common law the power 
of a grand jury to make presentment was not confined to an 
accusation of crime. Indeed, we find that the grand juries made 
use of the presentment not only as an adjunct of criminal pro-
cedure, but made use of it as an essential part of the adminis-
tration of the affairs of local government. See W. S. Holds-
worth, A History of English Law, vol. X, pp. 146-151. 
In discusing the use made of the presentment (Vol. X, 
pp. 147-148) Holdsworth says, quoting in part from Webb, 
The Parish and the County, 454: 
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Some times these presentments took the form of 
complaints that particular statutes had not been en-
forced by the justices and the other officials respon-
sible for seeing to their observance. "In 1700 when 
royal proclamations had vainly endeavoured to keep 
down 'the excessive price of corn,' by fulminating 
against forestalling and regrating, the Essex Grand 
Jury drew attention to, 'the very great neglect of 
several Constables in this County,' and incidentally· 
to the remissness of the justices themselves in not mak-
ing arrangements to insist on the licensing, according 
to law, of 'badgers, jobbers, and drovers.' 
The most important class of cases to which this pro-
cedure was applied was the class of cases concerned 
with the maintenance of roads, bridges, gaols, and 
other county buildings. Inhabitants were presented for 
not repairing their highways; counties were presented 
for not repairing bridges, gaols, or houses of cor-
rection; and disputes between different districts were 
fought in proceedings initiated in this manner. So 
normal was this procedure in these cases that it was 
approved and encouraged by the Legislature. * * * 
Again, at page 149, of the same volume: 
This machinery of presentment, of which so much 
use was made, had three good results. * * * In the 
second place, it gave the inhabitants of the county, 
who were chosen to serve on the grand jury, an oppor-
tunity of expressing their views upon the conduct of 
the local government; and therefore it was a check 
on the autocratic power of the justices. 
In volume I of the same work, at page 322, we find fur· 
ther comment: 
The grand jury of modern times still retains some 
traces of antiquity which have been lost to the other 
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vanettes of the jury. They consider the evidence in 
secret, and the court does not control or advise them 
as to their findings in the individual cases which come 
before them. It merely charges them generally as to 
the nature of the business which they are about to 
consider. They can always act if they please on their 
own knowledge; and Holt tells us that they often so 
acted at the end of the seventeenth century. They can 
act at the present day in much the same way as they 
acted in the thirteenth century. 
From the foregoing account and the footnotes contained 
in the cited text it becomes apparent that the presentment was 
used without as well as in conjunction with indictments; and 
when used alone it was for the purpose of calling the attention 
of the crown and the local inhabitants to conditions for which 
the officers of the local units of government were responsible. 
Chancellor Kent, in speaking of the English common 
law, says: 
* * * It has proved to be a system replete with 
vigorous and healthy principles, eminently conducive 
to the growth of civil liberty; * * * . It is the common 
jurisprudence of the United States, and was brought 
with them as colonists from England, and established 
here, so far as it was adapted to our institutions and 
circumstances. Commentaries on American Law, by 
James Kent, vol. 1, p. 343. 
This, no doubt, is the same common law referred to in 
People vs. Green, 1 Utah 11, 13, wherein the court was of 
the opinion that the common law was most positively extended 
over the Territory of Utah by the Congressional Act of Sep-
tember 9, 1850. 
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Where not specifically restricted by statute the grand jury 
functions with the same common law powers today as it did 
at common law. O'Regan v. Schermerhorn, 25 N. J., M. 1, 50 
A. 2nd 10, 20, 25. 
In the early days of the Utah Territory ( 1863) we find 
that a Federal Grand Jury considered it its duty to make public 
note of the conduct of the Territorial Governor, Stephen S. 
Harding. Tullidge, History of Salt L.1ke City, pp. 322, 323. 
We quote in part the Presentment of Governor Harding: 
Therefore, we the United States Grand Jury for the 
Third Judicial District for the Territory of Utah, pre-
sent his 'Excellency' Stephen S. Harding, Governor 
of Utah, as we would an unsafe bridge over a dangerous 
stream-jeopardizing the lives of all who pass over it, 
or, as we would a pestiferous cesspool in our district, 
breeding disease and death. 
This presentment was spread upon the records of the court 
in response to the request of the Grand Jury. Chief Justice 
Kinney in discharging this jury said, in part: 
I am well persuaded that in no spirit of malice or 
undue prejudice have you been induced to call the 
attention of the Court and people to what you regard 
as the official misconduct of the Executive, but only 
as the deliberate result of your investigations for the 
public good. (Emphasis supplied). 
Our statute 88-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943 provides 
as follows: 
The common law of England so far as it is not re-
pugnant to, or in conflict with, the constitution or 
laws of this state, and so far only as it is consistent 
10 
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with and adapted to the natural and physical condi-
tions of this state and the necessities of the people 
thereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of 
decision in all courts of this state. 
By the plain words of the statute the common law of Eng-
land becomes the rule of decision in all the courts of this state, 
insofar as it is not in conflict with nor repugnant to the con-
stitution and laws of this state and the United States. 
We have seen that at the English Common Law it was a 
settled practice for the grand jury to make public note of 
discrepancies existing within the local organs of government; 
further, that a Federal Grand Jury in territorial Utah found 
it its duty to call public attention to the faults of the territorial 
governor, and their action approved by the court in so doing. 
Our constitutional provision, Article 1, § 13, provides in 
part: 
* * * The grand jury shall consist of seven persons, 
five of whom must concur to find ail indictment; but 
no grand jury shall be drawn or summoned unless in 
the opinion of the ,judge of the district, public interest 
demands it. 
Certainly, the common law use of presentments is not re-
pugnant to, nor in conflict with this section. That the statutes 
of this state, as they relate to the functions of the grand jury, 
are likewise free from conflict with the common law of Eng-
land, is shown in the next succeeding subdivision of this 
brief by judicial authority interpreting statutes identical to 
our own. We think the constitution and laws of the state of 
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Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that we cannot but 
conclude that a grand jury, called in the state of Utah, has 
common law authority, sanctioned by statute, to return a pre-
sentment in the nature of a report even though an indictment 
docs not or cannot follow it. 
(B) Under Utah Statutes 
Chapter 19, Title 105, Utah Code Annotated, 194~, as 
amended, defines the powers and duties of grand Junes in 
Utah. Pertinent provisions of this chapter are herewith set 
forth. 
105-19-1, as amended by Chapter 13, § 1, Laws of 1947, 
provides: 
The grand jury may inquire into all public offenses 
within the jurisdiction of the court committed or 
triable within the county, and present them to the court 
by indictment, or by an accusation in writing. 
105-19-4. 
The grand jury shall not be bound to hear evidence 
for the defendant; but it is their duty to weigh all the 
evidence submitted to them, and when they have reason 
to believe that other evidence within their reach will 
explain away the charge, they should order such evi-
dence to be produced, and for that purpose may require 
the prosecuting attorney to issue process for the witness. 
105-19-7. 
The grand jury must inquire into the case of every 
person imprisoned in the jails of the county on a 
criminal charge and not indicted or informed against; 
into the conditions and management of the public 
prisons within the county; and into the willful and 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
corrupt misconduct in office of public officers of every 
description within the county. 
105-19-8. 
They shall also be entitled to free access at all 
reasonable times to the public prisons, and to an ex-
amination without charge of all public records within 
the county 
Appellant finds no Utah case which resolves the question 
at bar, nor any Utah case which interprets the provisions of 
the statutes above quoted. However, the question raised in 
this appeal has re!=eived judicial determination in jurisdictions 
whose statutes, governing the functions of grand juries, are 
in purpose and effect identical to our own. It is to be observed 
that nowhere in Utah law, constitutional or statutory, is there 
provision proscribing the use of a presentment in the nature 
of a report. 
We direct the court's attention to the law in the State of 
California; and in doing so we set forth the following pro-
visions of the Penal Code of California which are counter-
parts of those of the State of Utah set forth above. 
Section 915. 
The grand jury may inquire into all public offenses 
committed or triable within the county, and present 
them to the court by indictment. 
Section 920. 
The grand jury is not bound to hear evidence for 
the defendant; but it is their duty to weigh all the 
evidence submitted to them, and when they have reason 
to believe that other evidence within their reach will 
explain away the charge, they should order such evi-
13 
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dence to be produced, and for that purpose may require 
the district attorney to issue process for the witnesses. 
Section 922. 
If a member of a grand jury knows, or has reason to 
believe, that a public offense, triable within the county, 
has been committed, he must declare the same to his 
fellow-jurors, who must thereupon investigate the same. 
Section 923. 
The grand jury must inquire into the case of every 
person imprisoned in the jail of the county on a crim-
inal charge and not indicted; into the condition and 
management of the public prisons within the county; 
and into the willful or corrupt misconduct in office 
of public officers of every description within the county. 
Sectiort 924. 
They are also entitled to free access, at all reasonable 
times, to the public prisons, and to the examination, 
without charge, of all public records within the county. 
Under these provisions the case of Irwin v. Murphy, 129 
Cal. App. 713, 19 P2d 292 ( 1933), California District Court of 
Appeals, was decided; (hearing denied by the Supreme Court 
in April of the same year.) In that case an action of libel had 
been filed against members of a grand jury for San Francisco 
County, because the grand jury had returned a report to the 
court condemning the local prize fight game as a "racket." 
The report further stated that gambling cliques "and other 
evil influences" dominated the boxing clubs; that the boxing 
commissioner was unfit; that the testimony of a certain referee, 
before the grand jury, was in conflict with other testimony; 
that certain referees were selected as a money getting scheme. 
14 
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The report noted that the evidence received by the grand jury 
justified these conclusions but did not warrant the return of 
an indictment. In addition the grand jury made certain rec-
ommendations, among which were: that the Governor request 
the resignation of the boxing commissioner, that the license of 
Irwin, a referee, be perpetually revoked. The report was con-
cluded with suggestions as to remedies to ameliorate these 
conditions. This report was caused to be openly published by 
the grand jury. After deciding the report was privileged, the 
court specifically determined that the grand jury had not 
exceeded its powers in returning a report without finding an 
indictment, and at page 293, said: 
In the Matter of Tyler, 64 Cal. 434, 437, 1 P. 884, 
887, it was said: "A grand jury should never forget that 
it sits as the great inquest between the state and the 
citizen." From the foregoing it is manifest that a grand 
jury is inherently a body of inquisition empowered to 
make full and diligent inquiry into public offenses tri-
able within the county. This idea is carried out in the 
provisions of the Penal Code. Section 920 places the 
duty of investigation with the grand jury, and demands 
that this body not only hear and weigh incriminating 
evidence, but that it shall hear evidence which it may 
have reason to believe will explain or clear away any 
pending charge. Section 922 again places upon the 
grand jury the duty of investigating a charge where 
any member has reason to believe that a public offense 
has been committed. 
The appellant concedes, as he must, the foregoing. 
Thus conceding, he would limit any report of the grand 
jury to an indictment, presentment, accusation, or an 
express report ignoring the charge. In other words, 
appellant argues that when the commission of a public 
15 
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offense is being inquired into or investigated the power 
of the grand jury is limited to a definite charge, 
whether by indictment or otherwise, against the person 
being investigated; that if the grand jury does not find 
sufficient evidence to indict, the power of the body 
terminates and any act thereafter is in excess of juris-
diction. We think this too narrow a construction to 
be placed upon the powers of a grand jury. As a matter 
of routine, if nothing further, the power to investigate 
includes as an integral part thereof the right and 
duty to report the result of such investigation. The 
duty of a grand jury is to protect the citizen against 
unfounded accusation. Matter of Tyler, supra. Such 
a duty, coupled with the power of investigation, al-
most demands completeness of disclosure on matters 
investigated. It seems futile to attempt demonstration 
of the obvious. Law and common sense combine to 
compel the conclusion that, if a grand jury is author-
ized and bounden to inquire of public offense, a neces-
sary element of this power must be the power and 
duty to disclose the result of the inquiry. 
This case stands today as the law in California, and it is 
interesting to note that the court, while vigorously establishing 
the right of a grand jury to make a report without returning an 
indictment, does not limit the scope of such report to the 
censure of public officers only, but approves the censure of 
the erring private citizen as well. 
The State of New York, it seems, has dealt with the ques-
tion under consideration more than any other jurisdiction. 
In this connection it is again to be observed that the statutes 
of New York which pertain to grand juries provide for sub-
stantially the same procedure as do their counterparts in the 
Utah Code. We set forth the pertinent provisions of the New 
York Criminal Code of Criminal Procedure. 
16 
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Section 260. 
The grand jury must inquire, 
1. Into the case of every person imprisoned in the 
jail of the county, on a criminal charge, and not in-
dicted; and 
2. Into the wilful and corrupt misconduct in office, 
of public officers of every description, in the county. 
3-. The grand jury may inquire into the condition and 
management of the public prisons in the county. 
Section 261. 
They are also entitled to free access, at all reason-
able times, to the public prisons, and to the examination 
without charge, of all public records in the county. 
The case of In Re Jones, 101 App. Div. 55, 16 N. Y. 
Anno. Cas. 15, 19 N.Y. Crim. Rep. 59, 92 N.Y.S. 275, 181 
N.Y. 389, 74 N.E. 226, ( 1905), dealt squarely with the point 
here in issue. In that case, the grand jury, in the exercise of 
its inquisitorial powers, made a "report or presentment" cen-
suring public officials for the improper performance of their 
duties, without indicting them. The public officials criticized 
moved to expunge the report. The motion was denied. The 
court interpreted the above quoted statutes and reasoned as 
follows: 
We may assume that these powers are conferred for 
some purpose. Official inquiry intends either official 
action or official report. As such powers are limited 
to inquiry, and the grand jury has no executive or 
administrative authority in the premises, the result of 
any inquiry must be report or statement. which shall 
call attention to the wrong. The grand Jury can but 
report to the court to which it was returned, and by 
17 
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which it is discharged. Such reports are commonly 
termed "presentments." * * * 
I think, therefore, that any final finding upon the 
exercise of these inquisitorial powers may be called 
a presentment, and that it may be regarded as final, 
and not improper, because an indictment cannot or 
does not follow it. * * * 
_Such inquiry as is required by sections 260 and 261 
may reveal misconduct, inattention, or shortcomings 
of public officials, and the report or presentment might 
be colorless or ineffective unless it specified indivi-
dual delinquencies. I think that in such a case the 
grand jury can properly point out those individuals 
who, as officials, are deemed responsible, and that 
the presentment may stand though it be not followed by 
an indictment. It may be pertinent to call attention 
to the fact that inefficiency, carelessness, or neglect may 
require correction, and yet not justify indictment, and 
to the fact that not all willful or corrupt misconduct 
in office can be presented in the first instance by 
indictment; * * * 
The decision in the Jones case (supra) remains the law 
today in the state of New York, being the only case of its 
kind, in that jurisdiction, decided by an appellate tribunal. 
In addition, subsequent cases have affirmed this decision, the 
most comprehensive of which is that of In Re Healy, 161 
11isc. 582, 293 N.Y.S. 584, (1937), where all the New York 
cases to that date, dealing with the question, are reviewed. 
The years intervening between the Jones and Healy de-
cisions produced six cases in which the New York County 
Courts passed on motions to expunge grand jury presentments, 
returned without indictments. The first of these was Re 
Heferman, 125 N.Y. S. 737, (1909), where expunction 
18 
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was granted. The report here expunged recited no facts in 
support of its criticism of certain borough officials. In 1910 
the case of In re Osborne, 68 Misc. 597, 125 N.Y.S. 313, was 
decided. In this case, the court found there had been no 
evidence heard on which to base the presentment, and also 
dceided that the conduct of the Attorney General, the subject 
of the report, was not of sufficient general interest to warrant 
the return of a presentment. Next came In re Woodbury, 
155, N. Y. S. 851, (1915). The motion for expunction 
was granted, but again on special facts. In passing on this 
question the court, at page 853, said: 
It is unnecessary, in my determination of this ques-
tion, to decide whether "presentment" and "indict-
ment" are synonymous. Much has been learnedly 
written on this subject, and the weight of authority 
still seems to be that the grand jury has a right to 
make presentments, even though t,Qey be not followed 
by an indictment; but the courts seem to be equally 
emphatic in insisting that a presentment cannot be 
used by the grand jury merely as a guise to accuse 
and thereby compel a person to stand mute, if the 
presentment would warrant an indictment so that the 
accused might answer, and that when a presentment 
is merely a guise used by the grand jury to accuse, the 
presentment should be expunged from the record. 
In 1925 the case of Re Crosby, 126 Misc. 250, 213· N.Y.S. 
86, again held a grand jury authorized to make presentments, 
but said such a right should be used with caution, and a pre-
sentment or report of a grand jury should present facts ob-
tained as a result of inquiries authorized under Section 260, 
New York Criminal Code of Criminal Procedure. The next 
two cases reported before the decision in the Healy case (supra) 
19 
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were those of Re Funston, 133 Misc. 620, 233 N.Y.S. 81, 
(1929), and Re Wilcox, 153 Misc. 761, 276 N.Y.S. 117, 
( 1934). Both of these cases were critical of the use of the 
presentment, but it is submitted that the facts of each of 
these cases would warrant decision under the doctrine laid 
down in In re Jones (supra) . 
In 193 7 a vigorous reaffirmation of the Jones decision 
appears in the case of In re Healy, above cited. 
In that case th grand jury had returned a report censuring 
the vice-chairman of the Queens County Democratic Com-
mittee, who was not a public officer. Healy moved the court 
to expunge the report from the record. The motion was granted 
because Healy was a private person and not a public official. 
The court explicitly sustains the use of presentments, and 
comments on the soundness of the decision in the Jones case 
(supra), as follows: 
That there is some diversity of opinion among the 
decisions is apparent. Numerically, the number of de-
cisions which condemn the submission of presentments 
far exceeds those which have sustained the use of pre-
sentments. As a matter of fact, as has been pointed out, 
the only appellate court in our state which has passed 
upon the question has sustained the use of present-
ments. Jones v. People, supra. Notwithstanding the 
splendid, well-reasoned dissenting opinion of Mr. 
Justice Woodward, I am inclined to believe that the 
prevailing opinion expresses the intention of the Legis-
lature when it formulated the provisions of section 
260 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under that 
section the grand jury must inquire, among other 
things, into the condition and management of the 
public prisons in the county. If the only result of inquiry 
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with reference to the public prisons is limited to the 
findings of an indictment or silence on the part of the 
grand jury, then that suvdivision of section 260 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure will be almost value-
less, but, if the view adopted by the court in Jones 
v. People, supra, is to prevail, then very valuable and 
salutary results may come from intelligent investiga-
tions by grand juries. Prison conditions may be de-
plorable due to overcrowding, lack of adequate sani-
tary facilities, the age of the buildings, and to many 
other factors which may contribute to such condi-
tions, yet in no such instance might the grand jury 
be warranted in finding an indictment. Certain it is 
with the passing of time all structures become obso-
lete. Education and a better understanding of crim-
inology and penology may well authorize a grand 
jury to submit a presentment urging the erection of 
modern structures conducive to a better and more en-
lightened treatment of prisoners. It would be most 
unfortunate if such valuable contributions resulting 
from intelligent investigations expressly directed to 
be made by our grand juries should be lost because 
of the theory that a grand jury may not hand up a 
presentment. So, also, it is entirely conceivable that 
public officials, while not guilty of criminality, may 
be found to be so lacking in understanding or appre-
ciation of the duties which are part of their office 
that a grand jury may be discharging a very high 
form of public service if they report findings based 
upon a fair, honest, and thorough investigation of 
all the facts. Not long since a Queens county grand 
jury conducted an investigation into certain charges 
which were made with reference to the New York 
Parental School. As a result of a careful and painstak-
ing investigation, a presentment was submitted to this 
court which did not criticize or censure any individual 
or individuals, but it did boldly and fairly criticize the 
conditions under which the institution was operated 
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and did make certain recommendations relative to 
the continuance of the operation of the school, or in 
the event that such recommendations were not followed, 
that the institution be closed. The result of that pre-
sentment is that the institution is no longer operated; 
the taxpayers of the city of New York will be saved 
millions of dollars; and the great investment which 
the taxpayers have in the land and buildings will be 
placed to some beneficial use. 
The advantages to the people of the state in giving 
power to our grand juries to investigate in accordance 
with the provisions of section 260 of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure far outweigh any consideration for the 
feelings of public officials who may be criticized by 
such grand juries. The caliber of the membership of 
the grand juries is a matter which lies within the 
control of the courts. The selection of men of ex-
perience, of integrity, of high citizenship, of courage, 
of honesty, and with a reputation for fair dealing, 
is a problem easily solved by those whose privilege 
and duty it is to select and determine the membership 
of our grand juries. And it is only fair to assume that 
grand juries so selected will confine their present-
ments to matters which are properly subject to their 
consideration. Under the law of our state there is 
always available to the grand juries sitting at any 
term of court the advice of the district attorney and of 
the justices of the Supreme Court and the judges of 
the County Court. 
Long ago it was said that "public office is a public 
trust." Any public official should at all times be will-
ing to render promptly an account of such trusteeship. 
No matter what his office may be, he is but the servant 
of the people, and in accepting such office he must 
be presumed to know that his acts in office are subject 
to the scrutiny provided by section 260 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure. If he administers his .office 
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with a high regard for the trust which has been placed 
upon him by those who elected or appointed him, 
then he need have no concern about investigation; if 
he fails the trust, then, of course, he should have no 
complaint if the interests of the people are best served 
by disclosing his failure to fulfill the responsibilities 
and obligations of the office which he has assumed. 
Two later cases appear in New York sustaining the doc-
trine laid down in th Jones and Healy cases. In People v. 
Doe, 176 Misc. 943,29 N.Y.S. (2d) 648, (1941), the court 
had occasion to define the power of a. grand jury and, at page 
650, said: 
The right of a grand jury to hand up a presentment 
involving the conduct of public officers in the dis-
charge of their official duties was approved by the 
Appellate Division in Matter of Jones v. People, 101 
App. Div. 55, 92 N.Y.S. 275, and was considered 
by this Court in Matter of Healy, 161 Misc. 582, 293 
N.Y.S. 584, in which it was held that such present-
ments are limited to the acts of public officials, and 
may not be used against private individuals. It must 
- be presumed that the Grand Jury and the attorney 
general will be guided in their acts by these decisions. 
That same year a Grand Jury of New York County in-
vestigated certain charges publicized by Knight, an attorney, 
and found them baseless and returned no bill. In what amount-
ed to a presentment the grand jury requested transmission of 
the minutes to the presiding judge of the appellate division 
"for appropriate action against Knight." Applicant moved to 
quash the presentment. The motion was denied. Application 
of Knight, 176 Misc. 635, 28 N.Y.S. (2d) 353. In doing so 
23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the court, at page 3 56, sustained the grand jury's right to make 
a presentment, saying: 
No one may validly press the argument that a grand 
jury does not have the right to communicate its find-
ings in an appropriate case to the proper authority 
charged with a duty in connection with the matter 
reported. It might be more correct to say that the grand 
jury had a duty in such a case rather than a right. * * * 
The petitioner deems the report to be a "wholly false 
and libelous document" and states in his petition that 
its continued presence in the files of this court con-
stitutes a violation of his rights. The petitioner's 
opinion of the action taken by the grand jury cannot· 
be the criterion in the court's determination. 
It is worthy of note that the presentments under considera-
tion by the New York County Courts during the thirty-four 
years separating the Jones and Healy decisions (supra) were 
expunged because they were largely philosophical dissertations 
against sin without basis in evidentiary fact, and in In re Wood-
bury (supra), the presentment was procedurally defective 
in that it was not signed by the whole of the grand jury. 
In other jurisdictions we find decisions critical of the pre-
sentment, but these, we think, are distinguishable from the 
cases in New York and California, and the case instantly at 
issue, either on statutory grounds or because of their inter-
pretation of the common law. It remains, therefore, because 
of the distinct similarity between the New York, California, 
and Utah statutes, and the effect of the decisions of New York 
and California interpreting such statutes, that these decisions 
are more in consonance with what the effect of the Utah law 
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is than are decisions from jurisdictions where differences in 
the statutes or in the interpretation of the common law exist. 
Poston vs. Washington, Alexandria & Mt. Vernon Ry. 
Co., 36 App. D.C.359, 3-2 L.R.A. (NS) 785 ( 1911), was a 
libel case wherein a presentment against a private citizen was 
expunged. This case was decided under the provisions of 
Pollard's Code of the Laws of Virginia wherein Section 3983 
specifically limits the use of the presentment. We quote that 
section in toto: 
The grand jury shall inquire of and present all 
felonies, misdemeanors, and violations of penal laws, 
committed within the jurisdiction of the respective 
courts wherein they are sworn; except that no pre-
sentment shall be made of a matter for which there 
is no corporal punishment, but only a fine, where the 
fine is limited to an amount not exceeding five dollars. 
In State vs. Bramlett, 166 S.C. 323, 164 S.E. 873 ( 1932), 
a presentment was expunged, but the court there proceeded 
under statutes wholly unlike our own and reached its de-
ciison on the basis of an interpretation of the common law, 
which interpretation appellant thinks was misleading, because 
it was too restrictive in scope. 
In re Report of Grand Jury of Baltimore City, 152 Md. 
616, 137 A. 370 (1927), was a case where the Maryland court 
expunged a presentment which it found to be but a censure 
of public officials, and also proceeded on the premise (which 
appellant submits was erroneous) that the presentment was 
unknown at common law, except as an instrument to initiate 
prosecution for crime. 
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Four other cases which denounce the use of the pre-
sentment are Coons vs. State, 191 Ind. 580, 134 N.E. 194, 
( 1922), In re Grand Jury Report, 204 Wise. 409, 235 N.W. 
789 ( 1931), Rector vs. Smith, 11 Iowa 302 ( 1860), and Ben-
nett vs. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 183, Mich. 200, 150 N.W. 
141, ( 1914). In the Bennett case, the court found there were 
but two matters upon which a grand jury could return a pre-
sentment, viz., trespass on public lands and violation of the 
election laws. Because of the differences heretofore mentioned, 
appellant submits that these seven cases are without pertinence 
to the Utah County Grand Jury Presentment. 
(C) The Utah County Grand Jury Presentment 
This document, preferred to the court after three and one-
half months of taking testimony, investigations and delibera-
tions, in itself is a testimony to the conscientious and honorable 
manner in which the grand jury did acquit the duties devolved 
upon it by law. 
In the instance of each institution, made a subject of the 
report, the grand jury made no statements except such as were 
based on facts disclosed as a result of their investigations and ~ 
the testimony received of sworn witnesses. Appellant believes 
this fact to be apparent from a mere reading of the report. 
The report is not composed of irresponsible claims, calumny, 
nor even of merely well-meaning philosophical observations. 
It is respectfully submitted that this is not the kind of docu-
ment which, "under the guise of a presentment," is used as an 
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In addressing itself to the Utah State Training School at 
American Fork, the grand jury reported the existence of un-
sanitary conditions, overcrowded dormitories, "dirty and dis-
orderly conditions prevailing in the kitchen, the barbershop, 
the storerooms, the maintenance shop, the dairy colony and 
the farm colony, which no alert and efficient administration 
would tolerate." (Rec. 23). The grand jury further found 
evidence of drunkenness of employees while on the job, a 
practice at the school of employees taking the feebleminded 
girls for rides at night, no inventory or control of the supplies 
at the school, and that from the failure to keep a controlled 
inventory, the state had suffered the loss of $700.00 in sup-
plies, that only a feeble effort had been made to rectify this 
condition, but at the time of the report, the system was wholly 
inadequate. Certainly, not the least important of these condi-
tions is the following: (Rec. 2 7) 
* * * We have heard convincing proof of punish-
ment of feebleminded children by incarcerating them 
in a bare room at the school where they are left for 
hours without food and care. 
The attention of the Public Welfare Commission was 
directed to these conditions among others, and nine objective 
and constructive recommendations were made which, if fol-
lowed, would rectify the deficiencies existing at this insti-
tution. 
Those parts of the report which concern the activities 
of the State Road Commision in Utah County and law en-
forcement in Provo City are set forth in the same objective 
spirit, and are likewise bolstered by facts found after pains-
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taking investigation and conscientious interrogation of sworn 
witnesses. In each of these instances the attention of the 
proper officers and governing body is directed to the condi-
tions enumerated, and recommendations are made for their 
correction. 
Should the conditions encompassed in this presentment 
t;o unnoticed? Should the people and the heads of their gov-
ernment not be apprised of maladministration in administra-
tive agencies? As a matter of public record, it is observed that 
the three grand juries called in Salt Lake County over the last 
twenty-five years have considered it their right and duty to 
present to the public a report of their investigations. In this 
day of vast administrative machinery in government, where 
abuses and maladministration may creep in and remain for 
periods of time without notice, the need for the inquisitorial 
powers of a body of citizens composing a grand jury, and the 
right to make public note of the results of their investigations, 
certainly is as important as it was in common-law days. At 
common law, it was this instrument of presentment which 
was used for the precise purpose of calling the attention of the 
crown and the citizenry to failures in law enforcement and 
maladministration in local government. Holdsworth, A History 
of English Law, supra. At common law names were named 
and public officials were called to account. In this respect, it 
is interesting to note that throughout the entire presentment 
of the Utah County Grand Jury not one individual name is 
used. Even if the Utah County Grand Jury had seen fit to make 
individual references, the cases of In re Jones and Irwin vs. 
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The sage observation of Justice Terrell, of the Florida 
Supreme Court, in the case of In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 
Fla. 154, 11 So. 2nd 316 (1934), at page 319, is illustrative 
of the point. 
Every person who assumes the duties of public office 
does so with the knowledge that his official conduct 
is constantly under scrutiny by the public. For the 
purpose of detecting abuses of the trust so imposed, 
the law has erected what may be termed a three way 
switch, one of which leads to the Governor's office, 
one to the grand jury room, and one to the primary. 
Rectitude of official conduct is the only refuge from a 
plethora of light from these sources. At any rate, it is 
idle for one to think that he can administer the affairs 
of his office with one strabismic eye on the grand jury 
and the Governor and the other in pursuit of a course 
of conduct contrary to public morals. Public office is 
the most important trust demo~ratic government vests 
in the citizen. It is important because the integrity 
level of the political unit rises and falls with that of 
its official leadership. The honest officer is not averse 
to having the light turned on and if he objects, there 
arises a shadow of suspicion that may prompt a grand 
jury inquisition. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that an analysis of the 
English Common Law supports the fact that the grand jury 
grew up with vast inquisitorial powers and that the necessary 
adjunct of those powers was the right and duty to make report 
of the results of its inquisitions. Further, that the presentment 
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we1s not, and is not, an instrument to be used only for the 
accusation of crime. 
It is also submitted that the effect of the Utah statutes, 
pertaining to grand juries, is the same as that given their 
counterparts, by respectable authority, in other jurisdictions. 
Appellant believes that a determination of the legal and 
social considerations involved in this problem leads to the 
affirmation of the right and duty of a grand jury to make 
a presentment in the nature of a report of its investigations, 
even though an indictment does not or cannot follow. 
Therefore, it is asked that this court reverse the decision 
of the lower court and remit these proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
RICHARD J. MAUGHAN, 
Assistant Attorney General 
GEORGE S. BALLIF, 
District Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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